of these studies have shown that in many instances
Navy Enlisted Manpower and Personnel
sound operating techniques were not followed.
Classifications and Occupational Standards,
Some of the circumstances found to be prevailing
NAVPERS 18068-E.
in engineering plants are as follows:
Every PQS document contains the following
The information needed by the watch
sections:
stander was usually scattered throughout publica-
tions that were generally not readily available.
1.
Introduction
2.
Glossary of Qualification Standard Terms
The bulk of the publications were not
3.
Table of Contents
systems oriented. Reporting engineering personnel
4.
100 series-Fundamentals
had to learn specific operating procedures from
5.
200 series-Systems
"old hands" presently assigned. Such practices
6.
300 series-Watch Standing
could ultimately lead to misinformation or
7. Bibliography
degradation of the transferred information. These
practices were costly and resulted in nonstandard
8. Feedback Forms
operating procedures, not only between adjoining
spaces, but also between watch sections within the
MAIN SPACE FIRE DOCTRINE
same space.
The Main Space Fire Doctrine is a ship-
Posted operating instructions often did not
generated instruction that promulgates policy,
apply to the installed equipment. They were
implements procedures, and assigns responsi-
conflicting or incorrect. No procedures were
bilities for action in the combatting of main space
provided for aligning the various systems with
fires. According to this instruction, main space
other systems.
fires can be combatted with installed Halon 1301
systems, installed aqueous film-forming foam
The light-off and securing schedules were
(AFFF), portable fire-fighting equipment, EOSS,
prepared by each ship and were not standardized
underway and in-port fire parties, and repair
between ships. The schedules were written for
parties. The procedures contained in this
general, rather than specific, equipment or system
instruction are to be followed by all personnel for
values. They did not include alternatives between
conditions specified, such as in-port cold iron,
all the existing modes of operation.
auxiliary steaming, and under way.
Following these studies, NAVSEA developed
ENGINEERING OPERATIONAL
the EOSS, which is designed to help eliminate
SEQUENCING SYSTEM
operational problems. The EOSS involves the
participation of all personnel from the department
The Navy has developed a system known as
head to the watch stander. The EOSS is a set of
the EOSS. Essentially, the EOSS is to the operator
systematic and detailed written procedures. The
as the PMS is to the maintainer.
EOSS uses charts, instructions, and diagrams
Main propulsion plants in ships of today's
developed specifically for the operational and
modern Navy are becoming more technically
casualty control function of a specific ship's
complex as each new class of ship is built and joins
engineering plant.
the fleet. Increased complexity requires increased
engineering skills for proper operation. Ships that
The EOSS is designed to improve the
lack the required experienced personnel have
operational readiness of the ship's engineering
had material casualties. These casualties have
plant. It does this by increasing its operational
jeopardized their operational readiness. Rapid
efficiency and providing better engineering plant
turnover of engineering personnel who man and
control. It also reduces operational casualties
operate the ships further compounds the problem
and extends the equipment life. These objectives
of developing and maintaining a high level of
are accomplished first by defining the levels
operator and operating efficiency.
of control; second, by operating within the
The Navy has been increasingly aware of these
engineering plant; and last, by providing each
problems. Studies have been done to evaluate the
supervisor and operator with the information
methods and procedures presently used in
needed. This is done by putting these objectives
operating complex engineering plants. The results
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